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INTRODUCTION: THE FRIEND OF MY ENEMY IS MY FRIEND

F

lemming Rose has been a pivotal person in the European
debate over hate speech bans. As culture page editor of
Jyllands-Posten, Rose commissioned and ran the Danish cartoons in 2005 as a statement against what he saw as “selfcensorship.”1 Since then he has toured the world justifying his
* B.A., Columbia University; J.D., New York University School of Law; Ph.D.
in Political Science from Johns Hopkins University. Associate Professor of
Law, University of St. Thomas (Minnesota). I would like to thank Jacqueline
Baronian, Mitchell Gordon, Julie Oseid, Douglas Dow, and Robert Vischer for
their helpful comments.
1. For an overview of the cartoon crisis, see JYTTE KLAUSEN, THE
CARTOONS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD (2009). I discuss Rose’s motivations to run
the cartoons in Robert A. Kahn, Flemming Rose, the Danish Cartoon Contro-
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decision and calling for an abolition of hate speech laws.2 More
recently, he has put forth an extended theory of hate speech
regulation in his memoir, The Tyranny of Silence (2010).3 In a
short but rich fifteen-page English-language excerpt, Rose discusses the Danish cartoon controversy, recounts a conversation
with Salman Rushdie, and explains how hate speech bans facilitated the Nazi rise to power during the period of the Weimar
Republic.4 But the pride of place in Rose’s narrative goes to the
Soviet Union.5 Defending speech is a matter of opposing Sovietstyle censorship—a censorship Rose sees in European Islamists.6 As a result, he views supporters of hate speech bans
against Islamophobic speech as the new appeasers.7
One of the most striking things about Rose’s excerpt, however, is what he does not discuss. As I write this essay, I am sitting in St. Paul, Minnesota. In 1992, the United States Supreme Court struck down a St. Paul ordinance banning cross
versy, and the New European Freedom of Speech, 40 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 243,
260–63 (2009–10) [hereinafter Kahn, Flemming Rose].
2. Kahn, Flemming Rose, supra note 1, at 263–65.
3. FLEMMING ROSE, TAVSHEDENS TYRANNI [THE TYRANNY OF SILENCE]
(2010). While the book is currently available in only Danish, Norwegian, and
Russian, Rose has translated a fifteen-page English-language excerpt covering the first two chapters. See Flemming Rose, Read an Excerpt of the Book,
OF
SILENCE
(Dec.
30,
2010),
TYRANNY
http://www.tyrannyofsilence.net/page5/files/7f96eb2af2602318f4829282100ccf
99-0.html [hereinafter Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt)]. According to
the website, Rose’s book describes “the people and experiences that have influenced the way he views the world and his understanding of the crisis.”
OF
SILENCE,
Flemming
Rose,
Tyranny
of
Silence,
TYRANNY
http://www.tyrannyofsilence.net/index.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2013). The
website also contains a review of the book from Leif Davidsen of JyllandsPosten giving the book five stars and calling it “a study in the anatomy of
OF
SILENCE,
fear.”
Critics
and
Reviews,
TYRANNY
http://www.tyrannyofsilence.net/page2/page2.html (last visited Nov. 18,
2013). For additional background on Rose’s book, see Gina Gustavsson, Romantic Liberalism: An Alternative Perspective on Liberal Disrespect in the
Muhammad Cartoons Controversy, 62 POL. STUD. 53 (2013). Gustavsson, a
researcher at the University of Uppsala, views Rose an exemplar of a “romantic” liberalism under which the cartoons are an act of self-expression rather than an effort to bring Danish Muslims into the modern era. Id. at 10–
11.
4. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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burning.8 Rose did not mention this decision in his excerpt. Nor
did he mention Brandenburg v. Ohio,9 New York Times v. Sullivan,10 or the famous speech-affirming dissents and concurrences of Justices Holmes and Brandeis.11 In 2007, Robert Post,
one of the most prolific American writers on the subject of hate
speech, wrote an article in the journal Constellations arguing
that a truly democratic society would not ban the Danish cartoons.12 Flemming Rose did not mention him either, even
though there is some overlap between Robert Post’s publicdiscourse-based justification of speech and Rose’s own argument that running the cartoons would help incorporate Muslims into Danish society.13
The omission of American arguments about freedom of
speech is confusing. Rose is opposed to European hate speech
bans.14 The American First Amendment doctrine, at least since
the 1969 Brandenburg decision, also rejects hate speech bans,
as do many American legal academics. For example, Post argues that hate speech laws threaten the public dialogue necessary for a legitimate democracy,15 while Eugene Volokh, describing anti-Communist cases of the 1940s and 1950s, warns
his readers of the folly of balancing speech against other
8. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). For an inside account of
the case, see EDWARD CLEARY, BEYOND THE BURNING CROSS: A LANDMARK CASE
OF RACE, CENSORSHIP AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1995).
9. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
10. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
11. E.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 356, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
12. Robert Post, Religion and Freedom of Speech: Portraits of Muhammad,
14 CONSTELLATIONS 72 (2007) [hereinafter Post, Religion and Freedom of
Speech].
13. Both Post and Rose view speech as a means of inclusiveness. For Post,
the free public discourse renders the democratic process legitimate to the
losers of a legislative vote or an election. See Robert Post, Racist Speech, Democracy and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 282–83
(1991) [hereinafter Post, Racist Speech]. For Rose, inclusion of Muslims into
the Danish public discourse was one intended result of publishing the cartoons. See Flemming Rose, Why I Published the Muhammad Cartoons,
ONLINE
(May
31,
2006),
SPIEGEL
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/opinion-why-i-published-themuhammad-cartoons-a-418930.html [hereinafter Rose, Why I Published the
Muhammad Cartoons].
14. Kahn, Flemming Rose, supra note 1, at 265–66.
15. Post, Racist Speech, supra note 13, at 279–83.
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rights.16 Others, such as Peter Teachout, go so far as to criticize
specific types of European hate speech laws, such as bans on
Holocaust denial.17
Moreover, Rose has spent a great deal of time in the United
States. From 1996 to 1999 he was the Washington, D.C. correspondent for Jyllands-Posten, and in the wake of the Danish
cartoon controversy he traveled to the United States repeatedly.18 As such, he must have been aware of these arguments,
even if not in the precise form expressed by Post, Volokh, and
Teachout.19 Usually the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Yet
Rose refused to make common cause with American opponents
of European hate speech laws.
Clearly, something in the American free speech story was not
culturally appealing to Flemming Rose. On one level, this observation is unremarkable. Just as Robert Delahunty and John
Yoo argue against U.S. courts adopting foreign law,20 Flemming Rose is not at fault for ignoring the American First
Amendment canon in explaining a controversy that arose in
Denmark. Rose’s emphasis on the Soviet Union and his discussion with Rushdie, however, suggest that something more may
be at play. The problem is not simply that the American speech
canon is insufficiently Danish. Instead, Rose ignored the American free speech canon because, as currently constructed, the
canon simply does not speak to his situation—that of a free
speech agent provocateur compelled to publish offensive material to ward off self-censorship.
Rose’s rejection of the American free speech canon as inadequate—regardless of why he did it—poses a puzzle for comparative legal scholars. One leading theory, neo-functionalism,21
emphasizes doctrinal problems—scholars, judges, and other
16. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Constitutional Tension
Method, 3 U. CHI. ROUNDTABLE 223, 238–39 (1996).
17. Peter R. Teachout, Making “Holocaust Denial” a Crime: Reflections on
European Anti-negationist Laws from the Perspective of U.S. Constitutional
Experience, 30 VT. L. REV. 655, 690–91 (2006).
18. Kahn, Flemming Rose, supra note 1, at 265–67 (describing Rose’s trips
to the United States).
19. This is especially likely given that Rose worked as a journalist.
20. See generally Robert Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 291 (2005).
21. See Ruti Teitel, Comparative Constitutional Law in a Global Age, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2571, 2574 (2007) (book review) (describing functionalism as
“the preeminent approach to comparative law” for “generations”).

2014]

FLEMMING ROSE

661

actors seek out the best solutions to legal problems, regardless
of where they may be.22 Yet Rose, at the center of a free speech
controversy, ignored one of the deepest sources of free speech
doctrine. Another tenet of comparative scholars is that over
time, the legal doctrine across the globe on a given issue like
free speech will converge on shared norms.23 But, as we shall
see, Rose’s theory diverges from the American canon in several
respects.24 Is Rose simply a poor theorist? Or is The Tyranny of
Silence excerpt proof that the global debate over free speech
theory is more diverse than the convergence scholars suggest it
should be?
The rest of this essay explores these questions. Part I gives a
rough sketch of the American free speech canon. The canon is a
narrative, deeply rooted in American history, which separates
the bad times of censorship from the golden ages of speech protection. It also includes a set of maxims—morals derived from
the stories such as the marketplace of ideas metaphor and the
slippery slope argument. These maxims make the protection of
speech appear natural—at least to Americans.
Part II turns to the excerpt from The Tyranny of Silence and
a recent article, “Words and Deeds,” published in the Index on
Censorship.25 In the place of the American canon, Rose advanced a highly personal theory, one remarkably free from
doubt and heavily reliant on the Soviet Union as an antiUtopia.26 A key argument—that “man” is an inherently storytelling animal—comes from Salman Rushdie, whose novel, The
Satanic Verses, itself led to a controversy over the limits of
speech.27 Rose also discussed the relationship between freedom
of speech and the Holocaust.28 While Americans and Europeans
22. Id.
23. The emphasis on convergence is even true of scholars, like Ruti Teitel,
who take a more discursive approach to comparative constitutionalism. Id. at
2586 (arguing that “comparativism offers the potential for global solidarity”).
24. See infra Part II.
25. Flemming Rose, Words and Deeds, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP (Apr. 10,
2012), available at http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2012/04/words-anddeeds/ [hereinafter Rose, Words and Deeds].
26. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3.
27. Id. For an overview of the Rushdie affair, see RICHARD WEBSTER, A
BRIEF HISTORY OF BLASPHEMY: LIBERALISM, CENSORSHIP AND ‘THE SATANIC
VERSES’ (1990).
28. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3; Rose, Words and
Deeds, supra note 25.
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have debated whether hate speech laws could have stopped the
Nazi rise to power, Rose goes a step further and sees hate
speech bans as responsible for the Holocaust itself.29 Meanwhile, Rose says very little about the American free speech
canon.
Part II also briefly looks at what Rose does say about America. He briefly discusses slavery and sprinkles his pages with
quotes from American rock and roll icons like Bruce Springsteen and Bob Dylan,30 a fact that raises even more questions
about his failure to cite the free speech canon.
Part III takes up the implications of Rose’s neglect of the
American free speech canon in The Tyranny of Silence excerpt
for comparative constitutional theory. The neo-functionalist
theory of comparison cannot explain Rose’s refusal to adopt a
vast body of American jurisprudence that largely supported his
right to run the Danish cartoons. At its most basic, Rose’s neglect of the American canon reflects the truism of Clifford
Geertz and Tip O’Neil that all politics—and speech theory—is
local.31
Rose’s excerpt also poses a challenge to those, like Ruti Teitel, who see doctrinal law converging on a common set of
norms.32 He rejected the American canon for a more speechfriendly, samizdat alternative based on the daring speaker who
stirs the pot to unsettle a slowly creeping, Soviet-style selfcensorship.33 This is significant doctrinally—for once, the United States might not be on the absolutist fringe of the debate
over hate speech regulation. It is also significant theoretically
because it suggests that there is more than one coherent libertarian position to take.
The essay concludes with a call to incorporate identity theory
in the study of comparative constitutional law and to view de-

29. Rose, Words and Deeds, supra note 25.
30. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3.
31. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN
INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 218 (1983).
32. Teitel, supra note 21, at 2586–87.
33. The term samizdat was “coined to describe the system of underground
publishing in the post-Stalinist Soviet Union.” Ann Komaromi, The Material
Existence of Soviet Samizdat, 63 SLAVIC REV. 597, 597 (2004). More generally,
the term describes “any clandestine production and circulation of texts.” Id.
During the Cold War, the term signified “political opposition and heroic dissidence.” Id. More recently, this framing has become less relevant. Id.
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bates over a contested area of doctrine—such as hate speech
regulation—as an endless conversation rather than a linear
march to a world-wide agreement.34
I. THE CLASSIC STORY OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA
Identifying the “classic” First Amendment story of speech is a
difficult task. Each generation has its own account of the First
Amendment. What figures in the canon might be different in
1919 (or 1969) than it is today. Moreover, the First Amendment
protection of speech means different things to different people.
A sympathizer of the antiwar and civil rights movements of the
1960s might view the “worthy tradition” differently from someone who views him or herself as a likely victim of hate speech.35
But there is some overlap. Writing in the wake of the Danish
cartoon controversy, Post refers to the ban on the teaching of
communism as a “classic historical example” of American skepticism of hate speech laws36—the same point raised by Volokh.37 For example, both Post and Volokh see the American
34. My conclusions rest on the fifteen-page English-language excerpt from
The Tyranny of Silence. In the Danish portion of the book, Rose mentions
some American free speech authors, including Aryeh Neier, James Weinstein,
and Ronald Dworkin. These passages are quite brief. See ROSE, TAVSHEDENS
TYRANNI, supra note 3, at 252–54 (discussing Neier), 266–67 (discussing
Weinstein), 272–74 (discussing Dworkin). He also briefly discusses Oliver
Wendell Holmes’s “fire in a crowded theater” metaphor. Id. at 279–80. These
passages, however, do not undermine the conclusion that Rose has largely
ignored the American free speech canon. For one thing, the passages themselves make up at most five to ten pages of a 478-page book, a fact that shows
Rose’s ability to construct a free speech theory largely without reference to
the American canon. Not only that, with the exception of the “fire in a crowded theater” passage, Rose does not discuss any of the classic American free
speech cases. Indeed, he appears to have come to the fire metaphor through
the work of Alan Dershowitz. Id. at 471. So while Rose mentions some American legal academics, he largely stays away from the classic cases themselves.
A review of Rose’s index reveals a sharp contrast between the brief mention
of the American canon, with much lengthier discussions of Salman Rushdie
and the Soviet Union. Id. at 489–90. Finally, as we shall see, the fifteen-page
excerpt departs from the substance of the American canon in several key respects. See infra Part II.
35. This underscores the importance of politics in setting out the boundaries of speech protection, something Samuel Walker observed in his study of
hate speech regulation. See SAMUEL WALKER, HATE SPEECH: THE HISTORY OF
AN AMERICAN CONTROVERSY 1–16 (1994).
36. Post, Religion and Freedom of Speech, supra note 12, at 83.
37. Volokh, supra note 16, at 233–34.
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experience with anti-Communist laws in the 1940s and 1950s
as formative to the nation’s understanding of how speech protection works.38 One can compile these areas of overlap into a
general narrative, one that divides into four main periods.39
First, after a brief libertarian awakening following the rejection of the Alien and Sedition Acts, the country settled into a
long period during which speech restrictions were acceptable,
provided that the speech in question was associated with a
“bad tendency.”40 In the early nineteenth century, southern
states banned abolitionist speech; later on, speech prosecutions
targeted union members and advocates like Moses Harmon of
the free love movement.41 These were the dark ages of American speech regulation—an unhappy time to which no modern
American wishes to return.42
Second, after 1919, things began to change. Justices Holmes
and Brandeis, in a series of stirring dissents and concurrences,
began to articulate a new, more speech-friendly doctrine—
speech restrictions were only permissible when there was a
“clear and present danger.”43 If at first this was a minority position, by the 1930s “speech [had begun] to win” in a series of
Supreme Court opinions.44 A number of the strongest free
speech tropes date from this period—including Justice
Holmes’s placing the limit on speech at yelling fire in a crowd-

38. Volokh opens his article with a discussion of Communism and returns
to it repeatedly. Id. at 223, 233–34. For his part, Post refers to restrictions on
Communist speech as a “classic historical example” of government abuse of
free speech rights. See Post, Religion and Freedom of Speech, supra note 12,
at 83.
39. What follows draws on HARRY KALVEN JR., A WORTHY TRADITION:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA (1988); WALKER, supra note 35.
40. For an overview of the debate over the Alien and Sedition Acts, see
JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS (1951).
41. See CLEMENT EATON, THE FREEDOM-OF-THOUGHT STRUGGLE IN THE OLD
SOUTH (1964) (describing restrictions on abolitionist speech). For an entertaining study of the Moses Harmon trial, see Charles J. Reid Jr., The Devil
Comes to Kansas: A Story of Free Love, Sexual Privacy, and the Law, 19
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 71 (2012).
42. There were, to be sure, some victories for speech before Holmes and
Brandeis. For more, see DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN
YEARS, 1879–1920 (1999).
43. For a discussion of the clear and present danger test, see infra note 48.
44. For an overview, see KALVEN, supra note 39, at 168–78.
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ed theater,45 and Justice Brandeis’s adage that the best response to bad speech was more speech.46 This was the first
golden age.
Just as it appeared that the clear and present danger doctrine47 would carry the day, there was a relapse. This third period was defined as a time when the twin perils of fascism and
communism led to a great concern about protecting the state
against internal subversion. Here, Post and Volokh rightly
point to Dennis v. United States48 where the Supreme Court
upheld the convictions of twelve members of the New York
Communist Party whose sole offense was to teach the doctrine
of Marxism-Leninism.49 The case is famous for the idea that
the immediacy of the danger can be discounted by “the gravity
of the evil”50—a formulation that took the air out of the “clear
and present danger” test and suggested a return to the dark
ages of “bad tendency.”51 This was a time of loyalty oaths and

45. For more, see id. at 130–36. Interestingly, Justice Holmes made his
famous “fire in a crowded theater” comment in Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 52 (1919), an opinion that upheld a speech restriction. Schenck is
also the source of the “clear and present danger” test. Id.
46. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 356, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
47. The term, originally used as a restriction on speech, allows for restrictions when there is a “clear” and “present” danger of harm. See Schenck,
249 U.S. at 52 (upholding a conviction under the Espionage Act). With
Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States, however, the term became associated with protection of speech. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The doctrine peaked in the 1940s as the Supreme Court used the test in a variety of subversive advocacy cases. See
KALVEN, supra note 39, at 179–89; see, e.g., Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S.
583, 589–90 (1943) (protecting the right to tell others not to salute the American flag). Kalven describes the Taylor Court’s use of the test as “almost automatic,” adding that the test had become “commonplace.” KALVEN, supra
note 39, at 183.
48. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
49. Id. at 497–98.
50. Id. at 508–11.
51. See Chester James Antieau, Dennis v. United States—Precedent, Principle or Perversion, 5 VAND. L. REV. 141, 146 (1952) (referring to Dennis as
“retrogression,” one even worse than the “bad tendency” test because it does
not require any causal connection “between the expressions of the accused
and the substantive evil”). The “bad tendency” test itself emerged in the nineteenth century and traced back to an English rule banning publications that
had the tendency to “deprave or corrupt” the reader’s mind. Timothy J.
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McCarthyism.52 The stench of the era spread to other midcentury decisions such as Chaplinksky v. New Hampshire53
that might otherwise have been used to support narrow bans of
hate speech laws.
The final period began in the late 1950s when the Supreme
Court started to throw out convictions in three anti-Communist
cases,54 and it continued to grow during the 1960s as the civil
rights movement led the Court in a more libertarian direction.55 The culmination was Brandenburg v. Ohio when the
court restricted speech bans to immediate appeals to imminent
lawless action.56 This ushered in the age of free speech “absolutism” in which restrictions on political speech were looked on
with suspicion. A high point was the Skokie affair, when the
Seventh Circuit upheld the right of a small group of American
Nazis to march in a community with a large proportion of Holocaust survivors.57 The message—repeated in RAV v. St.
Paul—was clear: when forced to choose between protecting victims of hate speech and freedom of speech itself, American
courts would choose the latter. 58
O’Neill, Bad Tendency Test, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
AMERICA 61 (David Schultz & John R. Vile eds., 2005).
52. For a discussion of the role of loyalty in American life, see JOHN H.
SCHAAR, LOYALTY IN AMERICA (1957). For a good account of McCarthyism, see
DAVID M. OSHINSKY, A CONSPIRACY SO IMMENSE: THE WORLD OF JOE
MCCARTHY (1983).
53. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (upholding a disorderly conduct citation on the basis of the fighting words doctrine).
54. See KALVEN, supra note 39, at 211–26. Kalven described the change in
striking terms: “On June 17, 1957 the Cold War came to an end in the Supreme Court of the United States.” Id. at 211. The end came after the Court
ruled against the government in four cases “generated by official antiCommunism.” Id. The most important of these cases was Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), in which the Court reversed convictions brought
under the Smith Act against Communist Party leaders in California. KALVEN,
supra note 39, at 211 (describing Yates).
55. WALKER, supra note 35, at 14–16. For an extended discussion of how
the Civil Rights struggle led to the expansion of press freedoms in the United
States, see GENE ROBERTS & HANK KLIBANOFF, THE RACE BEAT: THE PRESS,
THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE, AND THE AWAKENING OF A NATION (2007).
56. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
57. For a brief discussion of the Skokie affair, see Robert A. Kahn, CrossBurning, Holocaust Denial and the Development of Hate Speech Law in the
United States and Germany, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 163, 169–71 (2006)
[hereinafter Kahn, Cross-Burning].
58. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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Yet even during the post-Brandenburg period there were exceptions. During the 1980s and 1990s, a number of states upheld laws banning masked demonstrations.59 These laws were
passed decades earlier to target the Ku Klux Klan.60 In addition, a number of cases made it clear that “true threats”—
including speech targeting the President—could be punished.61
In 2003, this led to Virginia v. Black, in which the Supreme
Court allowed bans on cross burning when done with the intent
to intimidate.62
From this chronology emerged several maxims of speech protection. I will highlight four. The first is the marketplace of
ideas metaphor of Justice Holmes.63 The idea, borrowed from
John Stuart Mill,64 is that freedom of speech will encourage debates that over time lead to the truth, or at least to the emergence of the soundest ideas for governing society. While the
metaphor has fallen out of favor with time—especially as people have questioned whether the marketplace is equal65—the
rationale fits nicely with an American focus on equality of opportunity (as opposed to equality of results). This is closely related to the idea of Justice Brandeis that the best response to
bad speech is more speech.66
A second theme is the slippery slope—the idea that allowing
a restriction of one type of speech will lead to multiple restrictions on speech. The idea has been expressed in Lee Bollinger’s fortress model under which any restriction on extremist speech (such as a ban on Holocaust denial) is a breach in the
walls that will lead to more restrictions.67 The fortress model

59. Kahn, Cross-Burning, supra note 57, at 173–75.
60. DAVID M. CHALMERS, HOODED AMERICANISM: THE HISTORY OF THE KU
KLUX KLAN (1965) (giving a state by state account of anti-Klan policies).
61. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (acknowledging the
power of the state to ban “true threats”).
62. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
63. Holmes referred to the marketplace of ideas metaphor in Abrams.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
64. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
65. See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth,
1984 DUKE L.J. 1 (1984).
66. Brandeis made this point in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 356, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
67. See LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 76–103 (1986).
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fits nicely with the experience of McCarthyism, when freedom
of speech was almost taken away in the 1940s and 1950s.
A third, and related, argument often raised by Americans
against hate speech laws rests on government mistrust.68 One
fear is that hate speech laws will be turned against the minority groups they were meant to protect.69 Government is not
trusted to draw lines between permissible and unacceptable
restrictions on speech.70
A fourth trope is the idea of libertarian toughness. Ronald
Dworkin, opposing restrictions on Holocaust denial laws, spoke
about the importance of protecting speech even when it really
hurts.71 Likewise, Justice Brandeis, in his Whitney concurrence, criticized those who gave in to fear by burning witches.72
Writing a half century later, Lee Bollinger argued that the best
reason for tolerating extremist speech was that it increased society’s capacity to withstand future acts of extremist speech—
in other words, toleration helps America develop a thick skin.73
While this sketch is not definitive, it should be sufficient to
compare the standard American account of why hate speech
laws violate freedom of speech with the arguments Rose raised
in the excerpt from The Tyranny of Silence. As we shall see,
Rose does not explicitly refer to the canon, and his arguments,
at times, are substantively quite different.

68. For an example, see Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus: A Modest Proposal, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 556 (1990) (describing how
Great Britain’s 1965 Race Relations Act was used against minority groups).
69. Id. This rationale has the interesting side effect of neutralizing the
race relations problem in the United States. If the government will make race
relations worse, they must currently not be that bad.
70. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 10 (1969)
(warning that “the apparatus of government required for enforcement of limitations on expression, by its very nature, tends towards administrative extremes”).
71. See Ronald Dworkin, The Unbearable Cost of Liberty, 3 INDEX ON
CENSORSHIP 43, 46 (1994).
72. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 356, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). However skeptical the American free speech canon is about the state
power, in his Whitney concurrence, Brandeis expresses a great degree of faith
in the ability of the ordinary man or woman to grow through courageous acts
of toleration.
73. BOLLINGER, supra note 67, at 237–49.
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II. ROSE’S THEORY OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Rose’s early forays into free speech theory in the immediate
aftermath of the Danish cartoon controversy did not rely on
American examples. For instance, when discussing the Danish
tradition of satire, he did not mention Hustler v. Falwell74 in
which the Supreme Court established a broad ranging right to
satire. Likewise, his discussion about self-censorship—even
when presented before an American audience—did not lean on
the American free speech canon. For example, in a 2006 Washington Post article defending his decision to run the cartoons,
Rose spoke about the Cold War and invoked Karl Popper’s The
Open Society and Its Enemies, but he did not mention Holmes,
Brandeis, New York Times v. Sullivan,75 or Brandenburg.76
When Rose did invoke the American free speech story, he
read it in a novel way. In a 2008 Copenhagen Post article attacking the denial of a visa for Dutch politician Geert Wilders,
Rose turned Holmes’s “fire in a crowded theater” analogy on its
head: not only was there a right to yell “fire,” but there was also a positive obligation to do so.77 This reading of the Holmes
metaphor owed something to the particular situation Flemming Rose found himself in. Critics in the United States and
elsewhere did not question his right to publish the Danish cartoons; they questioned his wisdom in doing so.78 This required a
more expansive reading of the Holmes metaphor.79
Rose, however, did frequently mention the other Cold War
superpower, the Soviet Union.80 There are biographical reasons
74. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
75. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
76. See Flemming Rose, Op-Ed., Why I Published Those Cartoons, WASH.
POST
(Feb.
19,
2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/02/17/AR2006021702499.html.
77. Flemming Rose, Op-Ed., A False Analogy, COPENHAGEN POST, Feb. 24,
2009, http://www.in-other-words.dk/background/clippings/editorials/1208.pdf;
see Kahn, Flemming Rose, supra note 1, at 276–77.
78. See Kahn, Flemming Rose, supra note 1, at 275–77.
79. In addition, Rose’s expansive reading of the Holmes metaphor may
reflect what Gina Gustavsson calls Rose’s “romantic” liberalism, a term she
uses to highlight Rose’s preference for action over reflection. Gustavsson, supra note 3, at 12.
80. For example, in his Washington Post article defending his decision to
run the cartoons, Rose refers to the lessons of the Cold War and mentions
several Soviet dissidents. See Rose, Why I Published Those Cartoons, supra
note 76.
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for this.81 Rose grew up a critic of Western imperialism and an
admirer of the Soviet Union.82 This changed after his 1980–
1981 visit to Moscow, where he met his future wife and the two
were kept under constant government surveillance—an experience he claims taught him more about Marxist-Leninism than
all his prior reading on the subject.83 One can see the influence
of this experience in his initial response to the Danish cartoon
controversy. His Washington Post article called “censorship on
the grounds of insult” a “popular trick of totalitarian movements” and then rattled off a list of Soviet era dissidents.84 He
warned that “[i]f you give into totalitarian demands once, new
demands follow.”85
One could object here that Rose is making a slippery slope
argument, albeit a samizdat one. But Rose’s samizdat framing
is noteworthy—he introduced his slippery slope argument as
the lesson of the Cold War. In addition, one must ask why Rose
failed to anchor his argument in the American rhetoric—
especially since he was writing in the Washington Post.
As one turns from Rose’s early writing to The Tyranny of Silence, the terrain becomes more alien from an American perspective. In particular, Rose’s theory of free speech departs
from the American canon in five ways. First, Rose inserts himself directly into his theory. Second, he rejects “doubt” as a reason for opposing speech bans. Third, Rose uses Soviet-style
censorship as a symbol of all he is up against. Fourth, Rose opposes what he refers to as “insult taboos.” Finally, Rose makes
a novel connection between hate speech and the Holocaust. I
will take up each point in turn.
A. The Political Is Personal
The American free speech story relies on distancing between
speakers and those justifying the right to speak. Simply put, in
the American concept, there is nothing heroic about speaking.
For example, in his Abrams dissent, Justice Holmes referred to
the authors of a pro-Bolshevik pamphlet as “puny anonymi-

81. For a brief overview of Rose’s experiences in the Soviet Union, see
Kahn, Flemming Rose, supra note 1, at 258–59.
82. Id. at 258.
83. Id.
84. Rose, Why I Published Those Cartoons, supra note 76.
85. Id.
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ties.”86 Rather, the people who are brave in the United States
are those who resist the temptation to respond to speech, rather than those who, as Justice Brandeis put it in his Whitney
concurrence, “feared witches and burnt women.”87 Likewise,
Bollinger’s tolerant society depends on forbearance.88 The liberal citizen is characterized by his or her refusal to respond to
speech with action.89
The Tyranny of Silence excerpt is different. Rose is unapologetically central to the story.90 As the publisher of the Danish
cartoons, he is a global figure—one often heckled and criticized.
Rose reports how he was called “the Danish devil” by the local
media in Qatar and how his visit there required the largest security operation since an earlier visit by Michael Jackson.91
Admitting that, in his younger days, he was “almost too eager
to please,”92 Rose reached the conclusion that “as a public figure” he has “come to symbolize a much greater set of issues
confronting the world today.”93 Later he compares his role in
the Danish cartoon controversy to the fall of the Berlin Wall—
historians cannot work out the causation of either event.94
Whatever Rose is, he does not view himself as a puny anonymity.
On one level this makes sense. By running the Danish cartoons, Rose did play a major role in a global (and European)
controversy over the limits of freedom of speech.95 As such, it
may be fitting that Rose plays a major role in his book, especially if one views it as an apologia for the cartoons. However,
86. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 626 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
87. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 356, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
88. EMERSON, supra note 70, at 10 (concurring that “maintaining a system
of freedom of expression” requires “[s]elf-restraint, self-discipline and maturity”).
89. Note the contrast to Gustavsson’s concept of Rose’s active “romantic”
liberalism. Gustavsson, supra note 3, at 12.
90. Rose makes frequent reference to his high-profile role as publisher of
the Danish cartoons, at one point complaining that “everywhere I go I provoke controversy.” Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. For an overview of the Danish Cartoon controversy and Flemming
Rose’s role in it, see Kahn, Flemming Rose, supra note 1, at 258–68.
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to the extent the book has as its focus Rose’s actions in running
the cartoons, one may wonder about the reach of American free
speech theory. Where Holmes, Brandeis, and Bollinger have
exercise restraint, Rose has acted.
Rose also made his book personal in a second, more intimate
way. Rose does not simply figure as the person who ran the
cartoons, but instead relies heavily on his experiences living in
the Soviet Union.96 To a lesser extent, he relies on his experience of being—unfairly in his mind—criticized for running the
cartoons.97 Both experiences play into two central themes of his
free speech theory—the rejection of doubt and his use of the
Soviet Union as an anti-utopia.
B. The Temptation of Doubt
Early on in his book, Rose raises the possibility of basing a
defense of speech on doubt.98 His initial motivation appears to
be humility (or insecurity). In the immediate aftermath of the
cartoon controversy, Rose wanted to document “that I was right
and others were wrong.”99 With time, however, Rose grew less
sure. Why did he “instinctively enter the fray?”100 Such involvement was not typical for Rose—he “doubt[s] too much for
that.”101 The cartoon controversy posed a personal mystery:
Why did a mild-mannered newspaper editor ignite a global controversy?
There is a narcissistic element to this—here is “the great
man of history” theory being explored by a “great man” himself.
But Rose went on to make a broader point about doubt and
freedom of speech:
Doubt evokes something unfinished, something uncertain and
imperfect, yet it is also, as the history of Western civilization
has shown, a great resource which is founded on the basis of
strong sense of self, a deeply rooted existential courage that
leaves room for debate and challenges established truth. Mov-

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ing through doubt towards a new truth is a process that is
sometimes shocking, painful and explosive.102

Doubt is “essential” for democracies because the latter are
founded on the idea that “no one has a monopoly on truth.”103
Moreover, doubt “nurture[s]” democratic institutions, including
freedom of speech.104
Rose’s connection between doubt, democracy, and freedom of
speech is very interesting. He seems to share Post’s concern
about the importance of free speech for democratic legitimacy.105 Not only that, Rose’s emphasis on “existential courage”
and speech parallels Justice Brandeis’s concurring opinion in
Whitney:
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free
speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women.
It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify the suppression of free speech there
must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result
if free speech is practiced.106

Both Brandeis and Rose see protecting speech as a courageous act—even if their views about the connection between
doubt and free speech are different (Rose views doubt as a reason to protect speech, while Brandeis sees speech as liberating
the human subject from “irrational fears”).
Rose’s paean to doubt is also similar to Laurence Rosen’s
comment about The Satanic Verses, which Rosen saw as a perhaps unsuccessful attempt “to consider how doubts about fundamentals could exist without fear that such doubts would destroy the faith.”107 Here is an opening that could connect Rose
to the moderate Muslims he likes to champion in his newspaper.
Finally, Rose’s emphasis on doubt dovetails with a skepticism
that lurks behind many American rationales for the protection
of speech. For example, the marketplace of ideas depends in
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Post, Racist Speech, supra note 13.
106. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 356, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
107. LAURENCE ROSEN, THE CULTURE OF ISLAM: CHANGING ASPECTS OF
CONTEMPORARY MUSLIM LIFE 172 (2002).
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part on doubts about the state’s ability to find the truth. The
same can be said of the argument that hate speech will be used
against minority groups. In a similar manner, Post relies on
American state skepticism to explain why hate speech bans exist in Europe but not in the United States.108 Given all of this,
do Rose’s comments about doubt suggest that a Euro-American
convergence is in the offing?
Maybe not. Rose does not stick with doubt for long. “Of
course,” adds Rose, there are “limits to doubt.”109 When doubt
prevents one from distinguishing “between right and wrong,” it
becomes “a threat to democracy.”110 Nobody could doubt, for example, the difference between “the prisoner in the concentration camp and the regime that imprisoned him.”111 As we shall
see, Rose connects his rejection of doubt to the Soviet Union,
the prime example of a totalitarian regime for Rose.112
But is this the only reason Rose rejects doubt? I am not so
sure. There are many ways to think about Soviet-style censorship and freedom of speech that do not remove doubt. For example, why shouldn’t the Soviet enforcement of MarxistLeninist truths leave Rose with an enhanced appreciation of
doubt? Likewise, I am not sure why the other parts of his theory of free speech require a rejection of doubt.
For Rose, the danger of doubt may be personal. Rose wrote
the Tyranny of Silence after standing at the center of an international controversy during which he suffered through what he
saw as unjust criticism of his decision to run the cartoons.113
Rose likened this critique to an “assault.”114 Perhaps his personal experiences explain his conclusion that there must be
limits to doubt—both for societies and individuals.115
108. Robert Post, Hate Speech, in EXTREMIST SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 122,
137 (James Weinstein & Ivan Hare eds., 2009).
109. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See infra Part II.C.
113. Indeed, he felt that many of the critiques were unjustified. See Rose,
The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3 (“It has been difficult to hear
others tell my story and interpret my motives without any particular
knowledge or basis for their assertions.”)
114. Id.
115. Id. Rose himself focuses on “[t]he connection between . . . the personal
motivations of the individual and all his or her views on greater sociopolitical
questions.” Id.
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C. Rose’s Samizdat Speech Theory
As noted above, Rose makes much of his experience in the
Soviet Union. He describes it as a place where freedom was not
a given and everyone looked over his or her shoulders.116 These
experiences helped Rose understand that “words meant something”—not to the government but to the speaker.117 Indeed
words could even be “dangerous.”118 In such a “fearful climate,”
official censorship was “almost unnecessary”—instead, “the
tyranny of silence was king.”119 Notice the shift in Rose’s
thought. In the traditional American free speech paradigm, the
focus is on the harm posed by the speaker. Is the United States
a tolerant enough society to allow a neo-Nazi or Klan member
to utter racist comments? The answer is usually “yes.” Indeed,
for Lee Bollinger, the decision to tolerate a hate speaker in a
specific instance serves as proof of the society’s tolerant nature.120
Rose takes a different perspective. Instead of concentrating
on the harm posed by speech, he focuses on the speaker. In a
society like the Soviet Union, fear became so enshrined that
words become “dangerous” and people become afraid to
speak.121 Rose uses his Soviet experience in two ways. First, he
uses it to create a general explanation of why freedom of speech
is essential.122 Second, he uses Cold War-era arguments
against Soviet sympathizers in the West to buttress his core
theory of speech protection.123 We will take up each point in
turn.

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See BOLLINGER, supra note 67.
121. To be fair, Rose’s focus on the danger of speaking is somewhat similar
to the language used by Justice Brandeis in his Whitney concurrence in which
he praises Americans for having “eschewed silence coerced by law.” Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 356, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). But for
Brandeis, the brave act is a social one—to “eschew silence” American citizens
enacted free speech protections into the Constitution. Id. By contrast, Rose’s
heroism is that of the individual, who faces danger whenever he or she
speaks. This is consistent with Gustavsson’s characterization of Rose’s free
speech theory as “romantic.” See Gustavsson, supra note 3, at 10–11.
122. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3.
123. Id.
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Soviet-style censorship, however deplorable, does not immediately suggest a reason for protecting speech. The Soviet Union is long gone. Even the most robust European welfare state
falls short of Soviet-style repression. This poses a potential
challenge to Rose’s use of his Soviet experience.
Not surprisingly, Rose responds to this challenge on a personal level. Just as Soviet citizens feared to speak, so has he.124
Describing his post-cartoon controversy experiences to Salman
Rushdie, Rose explained how “unpleasant” it was “to hear your
own story told without ability to comment.”125 He realized the
solution when he heard Rushdie say on television that “man” is
“a story-telling animal” and “the ability to tell one’s own story
is an existential right.”126 Rose, following Rushdie, explained
how:
[A]ny attempt to limit the story-telling impulse is not merely
censorship, or infringement upon a political right to freedom
of speech; it is an act of violence against human nature, an existential assault that transforms man into something he is
not.127

On one level, this is similar to arguments that defend speech
based on personal autonomy.128 But Rose goes a step further.
Not only does he view “any” speech restriction as “an act of violence against human nature,” but he also has a concrete Sovietinspired example of what this looks like.
Here, Rose’s Cold War arguments come into play. Rose describes the “closed society,” in Soviet terms, as a place where
the government dictates history and those who challenge the
official account of history face “censorship, imprisonment, or
elimination.”129 In defending his position, Rose warns against
those who argue that toleration of speech is a “cultural” is-

124. Id.
125. Rose added that the experience “felt like an assault.” Id. One wonders
how Rose would respond to American critical race theorists, like Charles
Lawrence and Mari Matsuda, who argue that the victims of hate speech face
silencing. See WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE
SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (Mari Matsuda et al. eds., 1993).
126. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3.
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. See C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Hate Speech, in EXTREMIST SPEECH
AND DEMOCRACY 139 (James Weinstein & Ivan Hare eds., 2009).
129. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3.
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sue.130 While conceding that some cultures are more individualistic while others are more collective, Rose warns against following the example of the “self-knowledge” school, “which advocated that scholars describe and analyze the oppressive regime on its own terms.”131 These scholars, in the name of cultural relativism, marginalized the Soviet civil rights movements and presented the dissidents as pawns of the Western
powers.132
This leaves Rose with a contrast. In free societies, people can
“tell and retell our own and other people’s stories”—all topics
are open for public debate.133 The resulting “exchange of ideas”
can move history forward.134 As examples, he discusses how
“challenges to the conventional wisdom” hastened the demise of
American slavery, National Socialism in Germany, and Communism in the Eastern Bloc.135 By contrast, once one begins
“limiting and controlling certain expressions” one is “only discussing what level of un-freedom” is acceptable.136 Put more
bluntly, societies that censor speech are taking steps toward
Soviet totalitarianism.
To buttress his argument, Rose draws a connection between
Islam and Soviet Communism. For example, he sees “parallels”
between Soviet dissidents and dissenters against Islam.137 Like
the earlier dissidents, opponents of Islam play a critical role in
making sure that the West lives up to its values.138 On a personal level, the Islam-Soviet connection helps Rose justify his
own actions while assuring his place in history. He published
the Danish cartoons as a response to self-censorship, just like
the dissidents who helped bring down the Berlin Wall.139
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. Interestingly, Rose makes no reference to Oliver Wendell Holmes’s
marketplace of ideas metaphor here.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. The Islam-Communism connection also has a biographical element.
Rose adopted his views about a possible connection between Islam and Communism while covering the Chechen wars of the 1990s as a reporter. As a
good anti-Communist, his initial sympathy was with the Chechens, but this
later changed. See Kahn, Flemming Rose, supra note 1, at 259.
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D. Rose’s Call to Abolish “Insult Taboos”
As we have seen, Rose draws heavily on his experiences in
the Soviet Union to establish that silencing is dangerous, given
the human need to speak. When faced with what he sees as the
new Soviets—radical Islam, the Organization of Islamic Countries (“OIC”) and its defenders—Rose is on fairly comfortable
ground. He can refer to the Soviet past and explain the importance of speaking out, and he has a ready-made argument
against censorship. But Rose’s argument is limited in scope. It
would ban blasphemy laws, especially with draconian penalties
one often finds in a majority of Muslim countries, but it would
appear less effective as an argument against the garden variety
hate speech laws one finds in Europe.140
But Rose’s support of free speech does not stop at preventing
radical Islamists from cowing dissenters into silence. He takes
the position that “any” restriction on speech leaves speakers
(and the larger society) un-free.141 In its near-absolutism, this
argument has an American feel to it. But Rose does not rely on
the harmlessness of the speech, or the positive role speech
played in the American movement for civil rights.142 Instead,
Rose centers his argument on multiculturalism and political
correctness.143
Rose begins with a choice faced by modern societies in which
people of different cultures live and work together in close
proximity.144 A society committed to equality could make an
agreement to ban all offensive speech. The logic of this arrangement is clearly stated: “If you respect my taboos, I’ll respect yours.”145 This solution, however, risks spiraling out of
control. Once one starts banning Holocaust denial, crimes
against Communism, or disrespectful cartoons about the
140. While one can oppose European hate speech laws on the merits, their
existence does not make France, Germany, or Denmark a totalitarian state.
For more on European hate speech laws, see ERIK BLEICH, THE FREEDOM TO
BE RACIST?: HOW THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE STRUGGLE TO PRESERVE
FREEDOM AND COMBAT RACISM 17–43 (2011).
141. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3.
142. For more on the argument that the civil rights movement sparked an
expansion of freedom of speech in the United States, see WALKER, supra note
35, at 14–16.
143. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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prophet, where does one end?146 There is only one way to avoid
the chaos from mutual insult taboos—namely, an understanding that “in a democracy no one can claim the right to be not
offended.”147
This has some overlap with the American accounts of speech.
Rose’s concern about where to stop after banning Holocaust
denial, crimes against Communism, and offensive cartoons is a
classic slippery slope argument.148 His point about no one having the right not to be offended is very close to Volokh’s own
response to the Danish cartoons—the fact that “I’m offended” is
not a good enough reason to ban a speech act.149
On the other hand, Rose places great emphasis on jokes. He
begins with the idea that no group in a democracy has the “exclusive” right to tell stories about itself.150 In fact, he imagines
something close to a free-for-all. In a democracy:
Muslims have the right to tell jokes and critical stories about
Jews; non-believers can skewer Islam anyway they like.
Danes may mock Swedes and Norwegians, whites can joke
about blacks, and blacks can joke about whites.151

To do otherwise is “simple-minded” and “harmful.”152 He then
asks whether practices like female circumcision and forced
marriage should be above criticism because they are only practiced by a minority.153
This line of argument is noteworthy in several respects. First,
it goes beyond the slippery slope argument in the way it assigns a positive value to joking. Criticism plays an important
role for Rose. In addition to helping to curb objectionable social
practices, it avoids “ghettoization” and makes it easier to communicate with others.154 As Rose puts it, in an open society it is
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. The fear that restriction of a narrow category of speech will lead to
other, broader restrictions is also a staple of Lee Bollinger’s fortress model of
speech protection. See BOLLINGER, supra note 67, at 76–103.
149. Eugene Volokh, The Twelve Cartoons in Detail, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Mar. 10, 2006), http://www.volokh.com/2006/03/10/the-twelve-mohammedcartoons-in-detail/.
150. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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much harder to maintain that an idea is “evil, perverse, or insane, unless that’s truly the case.”155 The closest American parallel is Lee Bollinger’s point that tolerating offensive speech
creates an ability in society to tolerate more speech.156 But Rose
goes even further—he sees insults as improving the quality of
the discussion by fostering a climate of inclusiveness.157
In this regard, Rose’s defense of joking may owe something to
the Danish tradition of satire he mentioned in his earliest defenses of the cartoons.158 He argued—unconvincingly to many—
that the cartoons would have the impact of integrating Muslims by including them in a national culture of joking.159 As I
pointed out in another article a few years ago, there is some
evidence that informal joking and teasing do indeed play a role
in Danish culture.160
If this reading of Rose is correct, it says something about how
theories of free speech get created. By hook or crook, he has become connected with a major twenty-first century freedom of
155. Id.
156. See BOLLINGER, supra note 67, at 237–49. The focus on the positive
value of public criticism and debate for a democratic society also bears some
similarity to Justice Brennan’s argument in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (“[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide open.”).
157. To continue the comparison with Justice Brennan’s opinion in Sullivan, Brennan sees the public value in a “robust” debate, but Brennan limited
himself to public officials, hardly a minority group. Brennan also seems to
lack Rose’s faith in the power of public teasing to foster an atmosphere of
inclusiveness. In this regard, Brennan’s opinion calls for a Dworkinian tradeoff: public officials enduring offensive speech so that society as a whole will
have a more open debate on public issues. See Dworkin, supra note 71, at 46.
158. For example, Rose raised the satire point during a CNN interview at
the start of the controversy. Kahn, Flemming Rose, supra note 1, at 263.
159. For the failure of these arguments to win over American supporters,
see id. at 268–78.
160. See Kahn, Flemming Rose, supra note 1, at 279–82. My article traces
back Rose’s inclusiveness argument to two Danish norms. The first is hygge—
the idea of social informality and social teasing, something that has been described as an adaptation to the lonely Scandinavian nights. Id. at 280–81
(discussing STEVEN M BORISH: THE LAND OF THE LIVING: THE DANISH FOLK
HIGH SCHOOLS AND DENMARK’S NON-VIOLENT PATH TO MODERNIZATION (1991)).
The second idea, egalitarian uniformity (folkelighed), expresses the goal of
teasing: to keep the “talented” in their place by pressing the message that
nobody is better than anyone else. Id. at 282–83. Taken together, these ideas
raise a specifically local, albeit partial explanation for why the cartoons controversy took place in Denmark.
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speech controversy. In defending himself, Rose has relied on a
specifically Danish way of viewing jokes and insults.161 As such,
the Danish concept of social teasing will gain from Rose’s fame
(or notoriety). This complicates efforts to view the debate over
hate speech policy as moving in a single direction toward a
common, global set of policies.
E. Speech Restrictions and the Nazi Rise to Power
Opponents of hate speech laws often discuss the Nazi past.162
There are good reasons for this. In the aftermath of the Holocaust, restrictions on hate speech laws have been premised, in
part, on a revulsion against Hitler’s crimes.163 The argument
can be stated broadly—“Words can lead to deeds”—which focuses the concern on Nazi speech in general. Or one can make a
narrower argument—the lax enforcement of speech restrictions
during the Weimar Republic facilitated the Nazi rise to power.
The latter argument was relied on by Karl Loewenstein, who
used it to justify his militant democracy theory.164
American proponents of speech protection have also taken up
the Nazi past. They have tried a variety of responses. For example, Ronald Dworkin, opposing Holocaust denial laws, simply balanced the Nazi harm against freedom of speech—the latter calls for sacrifices, even those that “really hurt.”165 Another
set of arguments focus on the passage of time. Criticizing Holocaust denial laws, Peter Teachout asks whether such laws are
necessary sixty years after Nuremburg.166 Finally, some writers, like Aryeh Neier, noting the presence of hate speech bans
during the Weimar Republic, took up the causal question directly—given these bans, how can the rise of the Nazis be
blamed on freedom of speech?167
161. Kahn, Flemming Rose, supra note 1, at 280–82.
162. For examples of free speech advocates who take this step, see
Teachout, supra note 17, at 689–92; Dworkin, supra note 71, at 46.
163. For an overview, see Cyril Levitt, Under the Shadow of Weimar: What
Are the Lessons for the Modern Democracies, in UNDER THE SHADOW OF
WEIMAR: DEMOCRACY, LAW, AND RACIAL INCITEMENTS IN SIX COUNTRIES 15
(Louis Greenspan & Cyril Levitt eds., 1993).
164. See Karl Loewenstein, Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I,
31 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417 (1937).
165. Dworkin, supra note 71, at 46.
166. See Teachout, supra note 17, at 689–92.
167. ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING MY ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE SKOKIE
CASE, AND THE RISKS OF FREEDOM 160–68 (1979).
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As someone who called in Israel for the open publication of
Mein Kampf,168 Rose had to respond to these arguments. And
respond he did—but in a quite novel way. When explaining
how it was wrong to let only members of a given minority group
tell jokes about themselves, he used the Nazis as an example of
a “persecuted and marginalized minority.”169 To be sure, Rose
is no Holocaust denier. His “Words and Deeds” piece is devoted
to exploring the relationship between hate speech and the Nazi
crimes against the Jews.170 But the reference to Nazis as “a
persecuted and marginalized minority” is bizarre.
To put this in American terms, does anyone refer to the Ku
Klux Klan as a “persecuted minority?” Or consider the Skokie
affair. It led to a wave of resignations from the ACLU.171 All of
this occurred even though Frank Collin, the leader of the Nazi
band who wanted to march in Skokie, was dismissed by many
at the time as an attention seeker, a puny anonymity rather
than a Nazi threat.172 Despite this, the Seventh Circuit, upholding Collin’s right to protest, did not refer to the Nazis as a
“persecuted . . . minority.”173 Instead, it expressed regret that,
despite “several thousand years of attempting to strengthen
the often thin coating of civilization,” there would be those
“who would resort to hatred and vilification.”174
Rose also has some unusual things to say about the Nazi rise
to power. In his “Words and Deeds” article, Rose makes a number of telling arguments against the position that freedom of
speech facilitated the Nazis.175 For example, he argued that
even though those who “defended the offended could adorn
themselves with halos of justice,” prosecutions actually gave
Nazis such as Der Stürmer editor Julius Streicher “a glorious
opportunity to bait the Jewish community in the German
courtrooms and in a national press, which otherwise would
168. See Kahn, Flemming Rose, supra note 1, at 265.
169. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3.
170. Rose, Words and Deeds, supra note 25.
171. For a discussion of the conflict within the ACLU, see DAVID HAMLIN,
THE NAZI/SKOKIE CONFLICT: A CIVIL LIBERTIES BATTLE (1980) (Hamlin was the
executive director of the Illinois American Civil Liberties Union chapter during the Skokie affair).
172. See Kahn, Cross-Burning, supra note 57, at 169–71.
173. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3; Collin v. Smith,
578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
174. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d at 1210.
175. Rose, Words and Deeds, supra note 25.
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have spared them precious little ink.”176 He also noted how
Weimar courts issued narrow interpretations of the law against
religious incitement—for example, by treating anti-Semitic
propaganda as targeting Jews as a “race” and therefore falling
outside the scope of the law.177 To buttress his points, Rose referred to American and Canadian participants in this debate,
such as historian William Showalter and Alan Borovoy, then
leader of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.178
But Rose reached an unusually broad conclusion. Instead of
simply rejecting the premise that Nazi hate speech paved the
way for the Holocaust, Rose turned it on its head: “In fact, one
might forcibly argue that what paved the way for the Holocaust
was the ban on hate speech.”179 This statement is ambiguous.
Read the wrong way, it can be seen as transferring some of the
blame for the Holocaust from the Nazis to supporters of Weimar-era hate speech bans, a group that doubtless included
some Jews.
Other parts of the article reflect Rose’s Soviet experience. For
example, he started a section of the article, titled “Nazi Germany and free speech,” by discussing how in the Soviet Union,
“the machinery of propaganda vanished away nationalism.”180
He went on to describe Hitler’s Germany as a “tyranny of silence,” under which “no freedom existed to counter the witchhunt against the Jewish community.”181 However reasonable
this description is of speech restrictions in Hitler’s Germany,
which grew draconian as the Second World War progressed,182
the phrasing is odd. Was censorship—even Hitler’s—an important causal factor behind the Holocaust? One gets the sense
that Rose is stretching his samizdat free speech theory beyond
its comfort zone.183
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. (emphasis in original).
180. Id. (emphasis added).
181. Id.
182. See INGO MÜLLER, HITLER’S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH
140–52 (1991) (describing how the People’s Court would extract harsh punishments—including the death penalty—for the expression of defeatist sentiments).
183. To raise another point about Rose’s treatment of the Nazi past, in his
book Rose explains how “a particular interpretation of the prelude to the Second World War in Europe” is “affecting [hate speech] legislation all over the
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Overall, Rose’s foray into the Nazi past was a strange one. He
made a larger argument than he needed to carry his point (i.e.,
hate speech bans, rather than being ineffective, helped cause
the Nazi seizure of power) and sought to remake the Nazi past
in the image of Soviet repression.184
F. Where Does America Fit In?
To summarize, Rose’s theory of freedom of speech departs
from the classic American free speech story in several respects.
His account is unduly personal, and after some temptation,
Rose rejects the skepticism so characteristic of the American
free speech canon.185 Instead, Rose relies on his experiences in
the Soviet Union to create an account that emphasizes the
harm censorship poses to the speaker, rather than the harm
the tolerated speech poses to society.186 According to Rose, any
restrictions on speech leave the speaker—and society—less
free.187 Rose combines this with a confidence in the power of
jokes, insults, and good-natured teasing to advance social
change, something he may draw from Danish political culture.188 Finally, faced with the Nazi example—a hurdle present
for Europeans who oppose hate speech laws—he falls back on
his anti-Soviet theory of speech protection.189 The period to be
concerned with is not the Nazi rise to power, it is the “tyranny
of silence” that ensued after 1933.190
America figures very little into all of this. For someone who
was a staple on CNN at the height of the cartoon controversy,191 this is odd. One can speculate on reasons for this. Was
Rose disappointed in the failure of most American papers to
run the Danish cartoons? Or was his theory of free speech
globe.” Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3 (emphasis added). Rose’s choice of language hearkens back to the Nuremburg trials when
the evil of the Holocaust was not viewed separately from Germany’s responsibility for starting the Second World War.
184. In The Tyranny of Silence, Rose deals with the Weimar example in a
more measured way. According to Rose, the Republic failed to enforce the
laws it had. Moreover, “evil deeds, not evil words” toppled the Republic. Id.
185. See supra Parts II.A, II.B.
186. See supra Part II.C.
187. See supra Part II.D.
188. Id.
189. See supra Part II.E.
190. Id.
191. Kahn, Flemming Rose, supra note 1, at 263–64.
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largely in place before he came to “symbolize a much greater
set of issues?”192 Or does this say something about how free
speech theories—like political theories more generally—are inherently grounded in the identity of the nation, ethnic group, or
society that holds them? To put it another way, is the real problem one of expecting—from an American perspective—that
Rose would mention Oliver Wendell Holmes, the marketplace
of ideas, or Justice Brandeis’s concurring opinion in Whitney v.
California?193
But before drawing larger conclusions, let us focus on what
Rose does draw from the United States. Some of Rose’s arguments could have been presented in classic American terms.
For example, his discussion of insult taboos could be worked
into a slippery slope argument (or something akin to Lee Bollinger’s fortress model).194 Rose also comes close to the marketplace of ideas theme, especially when describing how fulsome
discussions brought down Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and
American slavery.195 There would have been more comparisons,
perhaps, had Rose gone with his passing comments about the
role of doubt in justifying freedom of speech.
However, the excerpt from The Tyranny of Silence contains
only one explicit reference to the free speech canon. Early on in
the excerpt Rose commends the American “tradition of upholding absolute freedom of expression” to his European readers:
Faced with growing diversity, Europe has recently tended to
increase restrictions on the freedom of expression; the majority of the laws criminalizing the denial of the Holocaust have
been passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The United
States, with its tradition of upholding absolute freedom of expression, stands more and more alone on this issue. In my

192. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3.
193. Maybe Rose is uncomfortable with American canons, the rejection of
McCarthyism, and the Cold War framing that goes with it. Consider Harry
Kalven Jr.’s observations that, for the Supreme Court, the Cold War ended in
1957. KALVEN, supra note 39, at 211. How appealing can this be for Flemming Rose who, in his own way, is still fighting the Cold War today?
194. For more on Rose’s use of slippery slope arguments, see Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3; see also BOLLINGER, supra note 67, at
76–103.
195. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3.
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opinion, Europe should learn more from our friends on the
other side of the Atlantic.196

On one level, the message here is fairly straightforward—
Europe should become more like the United States and adopt
“absolute freedom of expression.” One wonders, however, why
in the excerpt of The Tyranny of Silence, there is little else on
offer.197
By mentioning Europe’s growing diversity, Rose draws a contrast with an already diverse America.198 In an earlier Spiegel
article, Rose struck a similar tone. In the article, he described a
visit to Brighton Beach where he encountered a “burgeoning,
bustling, and altogether vibrant Russian immigrant community” and marveled at “America’s ability to absorb newcomers”—
something Europe apparently lacked.199
Rose is also a fan of American rock music. To be sure, in his
Spiegel article he called John Lennon’s Imagine “beautiful but
stupid”200—a reflection perhaps of his experiences in the Soviet
Union. But he started a heading of The Tyranny of Silence excerpt, titled “Satire and Mass Murder,” with quotations from
Bob Dylan and Bruce Springsteen songs.201
Despite this, Rose has kept his distance from American legal
culture. Perhaps the marketplace of ideas is less pithy than
Bruce Springsteen. Perhaps it reflects unease with the classic
American world view of freedom of speech. Or perhaps, unlike
the dominant global position of American rock and roll music,
in the worldwide discussion over freedom of speech Holmes,

196. Id.
197. Let me reiterate that my comments are based on the English-language
excerpt on Rose’s website. There may well be more discussion of the United
States in the yet to be translated part of his 528 page book.
198. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3.
199. Rose, Why I Published the Muhammad Cartoons, supra note 13. Interestingly, Rose mentions American slavery as one of the three systems of evil
brought down by the power of free speech. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3.
200. Rose, Why I Published the Muhammad Cartoons, supra note 13.
201. Rose, The Tyranny of Silence (Excerpt), supra note 3. The Bob Dylan
lyrics Rose used were: “Never been’ able to separate the good from the bad/
Ooh, I can’t stand it, I can’ stand it /It’s making me feel so sad.” From Bruce
Springsteen, Rose quoted: “I woke up this morning to an empty sky.” Id.
Likewise, Rose’s website promoting his book sports a quote from Simon &
Garfunkel: “Fools, said I, you do not know, silence like a cancer grows.” Id.
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Brandeis, and the rest of the American free speech canon are
not the only game in town.
III. ROSE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Rose’s failure to rely on the American free speech canon in
The Tyranny of Silence also has implications for how comparative law scholars look at the global discourse over areas of legal
doctrine such as freedom of speech. One of the leading theories,
neo-functionalism, takes the position that “the relevant unit of
analysis is not a geographic entity, such as a country or region
. . . but rather the problem and its legal solution.”202 The goal of
comparative analysis is to solve a doctrinal question—such as
when to ban hate speech.203 For neo-functionalists, there is no
other reason to turn to foreign law. In the words of comparative
scholar Rudolph Jhering: “The reception of foreign legal institutions is not a matter of nationality, but of usefulness and
need.”204
One could avoid the theoretical issue by simply concluding
that the American canon was not “useful” for Rose. As Jhering
puts it, “No one bothers to fetch a thing from afar when he has
one as good or better at home.”205 This possibility, that the
American speech canon is not “useful,” can help counter the
tendency of Americans to view the First Amendment as the
panacea to all the world’s problems.206
But what if the American canon in fact does contain at least
something useful to Rose? Neo-functionalism starts from the
premise that people are rational actors who seek the “best” solution to their legal problems—be it abolishing the death pen202. Teitel, supra note 21, at 2574.
203. Over time, comparative analysis will lead to a “significant degree of
congruence between problems and their possible solutions.” Id. at 2576 (quoting NORMAN DORSEN, MICHEL ROSENFELD, ANDRÁS SAJÓ & SUSANNE BAER,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASE AND MATERIALS 8 (2003)).
204. Id. at 2575 (quoting Rudolph Jhering) (internal citations omitted).
205. Id.
206. This tendency was especially strong after the fall of the Berlin wall.
For example, A.E. Dick Howard, reading through the constitutions of the
“fledgling democracies” of “Central and Eastern Europe,” argued that “the
United States Constitution and Bill of Rights are widely recognized as furnishing paradigms of the fundamental principles that define constitutional
democracy.” A.E. Dick Howard, How Ideas Travel: Rights at Home and
Abroad, in CONSTITUTION MAKING IN EASTERN EUROPE 14–15 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1993).
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alty for juveniles, extending gay rights, or protecting freedom
of speech.207 The good lawyers join hands across the world—or
at least across the democratic world208—to solve common problems. Rose’s memoir complicates this picture. He ignored a potentially useful interpretive frame of reference.
While neo-functionalists insist on leaving out “nationality,” is
it possible that considerations of national identity helped to explain Rose’s rejection of a “foreign” model of speech interpretation? One can see echoes of national identity in the debate over
the global protection of hate speech dominated by an unwillingness of Americans to adopt European theories of hate
speech regulation and vice versa.209
For example, Hungarian scholar András Koltay called Lee
Bollinger’s argument that allowing hate speech makes a society
more tolerant a “brave and genuine American theory.”210 Koltay
added that such a theory may flourish “in the homeland of two
hundred years of uninterrupted constitutional development”
but that “the European eye looks at it as a curiosity.”211 One
sees something similar in Canadian complaints about American First Amendment “romanticism.”212 These two incidents
can be viewed as resistance to an Americanization of free
207. See Teitel, supra note 21, at 2577–78. Here Teitel is justly critical, accusing the neo-functionalists of assuming “[a] shared understanding of the
aims of constitutionalism that has not yet emerged.” Id. at 2576.
208. Id. at 2592.
209. This dynamic works in two ways. First, the stories and narratives that
accompany legal doctrines like the American free speech canon are a source
of shared identity, creating an imagined community in which Americans
across the country know what free speech is. In this regard, the First
Amendment canon is an expression of national identity, no different from a
monument, museum, or public park. See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED
COMMUNITIES 163–80 (rev. ed. 1991) (describing how maps, census data, and
museum icons hold a much broader “imagined community” together). Second,
members of a given community will reject what they perceive as alien legal
doctrines as a way of distinguishing themselves from other groups. See Fredrik Barth, Introduction, in ETHNIC GROUPS AND BOUNDARIES 9, 15–16 (Fredrik
Barth ed., 1969).
210. ANDRÁS KOLTAY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE UNREACHABLE MIRAGE 13
(2013) (discussing BOLLINGER, supra note 67) (emphasis added).
211. Id.
212. See Robert A. Kahn, Hate Speech and National Identity: The Case of
the United States and Canada 16–17 (Univ. of St. Thomas Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-02, 2008) (citing Alan Borovoy et al., Language as Violence v. Freedom of Expression: Canadian and American Perspectives on
Group Defamation, 17 BUFF. L. REV. 337, 353–54 (1987)).
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speech discourse, and Rose’s arguments can be viewed as a
third.
This leads to a second point. Rose did not simply ignore the
American speech canon. He also relied on his experience in the
Soviet Union and his conversations with Salman Rushdie.213
These are not Danish sources, but they are not American either. This raises a second problem with comparative constitutional theory. In critiquing the neo-functionalists, Teitel calls
for a “dialogic” approach to the study of comparative constitutional discourse.214 The new approach involves moving from
“diffusion and reception” of legal ideas to “dialogue” that “is not
bound in path-dependent or hierarchic ways.”215
On one level this is encouraging. Teitel rightly charges neofunctionalism with “abstract[ing] problems from their particular contexts to arrive at a constitutionalism hardly identifiable
with politics or place.”216 But for Teitel the dialogic approach is
still “normative”—her goal is “global solidarity,” which will create “cosmopolitan effects” that may “transcend” individual
states.217 In the area of human rights, the dialogue will render
a “universal law of humanity,” what she calls “the culmination
of comparativism.”218
If Rose were interested in “global solidarity,” he could have
built a theory of free speech that rested at least partly on the
American free speech canon. But he did not. Indeed, his emphasis is on the story-teller who is propelled by human nature
to fight self-censorship.219 This is quite different from the
American free speech ethos, which views tolerating offensive
speech as an act of restraint and suggests that there is more
than one way of defending freedom of speech.220 The gap between Rose’s theory and the American norm highlights the
competitive nature of speech claims—one already evident in

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

ROSE, THE TYRANNY OF SILENCE, supra note 3.
Teitel, supra note 21, at 2584–87.
Id. at 2586.
Id. at 2577.
Id. at 2586–87.
Id. at 2593.
ROSE, THE TYRANNY OF SILENCE, supra note 3.
BOLLINGER, supra note 67, at 243.
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the heated debates about the competing rationales for protecting speech.221
Of course, Rose is not merely a free speech theorist; he is also
a participant in a global dispute. When one combines this with
the global outrage that accompanied the publication of the
Danish cartoons, one would be tempted to dismiss Rose.222 But
this does not do justice to the scope of issues Rose covers in his
book and the depth of his thought. Nor is Rose alone. The conception of human nature that underlies his theory draws heavily from Salman Rushdie.223 Rather than wishing Rose’s theory
away, the more intellectually honest course is to accept that
there are multiple theories of speech protection, all of which
are competing with each other in an increasingly wellconnected world.224

221. See generally KOLTAY, supra note 210, at 3–18 (describing rationales
for protecting speech based on truth-seeking, democratic legitimacy, and personal autonomy).
222. Jytte Klausen, writing as the controversy reached its peak, was dismissive of Rose, describing the cartoons as a “gag, the kind you do when the
news was slow.” See Jytte Klausen, Cartoon Jihad—Rotten Judgment in the
ONLINE
(Feb.
8,
2006),
State
of
Denmark,
SPIEGEL
http://www.spiegel.de/international/cartoon-jihad-rotten-judgment-in-thestate-of-denmark-a-399653.html. Others saw the cartoons as part of a broader anti-Muslim sentiment brewing in Denmark. See Robert A. Kahn, The
Danish Cartoon Controversy and the Exclusivist Turn in European Civic Nationalism, 8 STUD. ETHNICITY & NATIONALISM 524, 528–30 (2008) (describing
the political climate in which the Danish cartoons ran).
223. In a 2012 speech in Delhi, Rushdie defended speech in language very
similar to Rose. See Alison Flood, Salman Rushdie Defends Freedom of
Speech in a Rousing Address in Delhi, GUARDIAN, Mar. 27, 2012 (describing
the “human being” as a “language animal” and describing censorship of any
kind as an “existential crime”).
224. Indeed, the Rose-Rushdie position on speech, with its emphasis on the
human need to tell stories, could challenge the standard accounts of speech
based on truth, democratic deliberation, and personal autonomy, especially
given the Rose-Rushdie emphasis on the role of the artist in society. Another
feature is how—in both the Danish cartoon and Satanic Verses controversies—the expressive act becomes an iconic text whose public display is itself a
symbol of freedom of speech. Thus, when Kurt Westergaard, the author of the
turban cartoon, was attacked, one response was to re-run the Danish cartoons. Newspapers Reprint Prophet Mohammed Cartoon, CNN (Feb. 13,
2008),
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/02/13/denmark.cartoon.
Likewise, after a Rushdie event was cancelled in Delhi, his supporters engaged in a public reading of The Satanic Verses. See Flood, supra note 223.
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Likewise, Teitel misses this element of conflict and uncertainty when she writes that “comparativism offers the potential
for global solidarity” and that comparative constitutionalism
can “interrogate[] foreign mores as a step in the pursuit of universal morality.”225 Are “global solidarity” and “universal morality” always worthy goals? What if, for example, the “universal morality” imposes a ceiling on rights rather than a floor?
Consider, for example, the question of banning Holocaust denial. In 2008, the European Union adopted a framework decision
requiring that member states ban Holocaust denial, thereby
expanding a ban that may make sense in France, Germany,
and Austria to other countries where Holocaust denial is less of
a problem.226 The Europe-wide directive is a move toward a
universal norm, but this does not necessarily mean it is a good
decision.227
The global discourse over free speech is best seen as a rough
and tumble argument. There may well be areas—such as the
death penalty for juveniles—where there is evidence of convergence.228 And it is certainly legitimate to argue, as a normative
matter, that the global debate over free speech should converge
around a given set of norms, something Geert Wilders asserts
when he calls for “[a] First Amendment for Europe”229—
although this formulation still leaves Asia, Africa, and Latin

225. Teitel, supra note 21, at 2586, 2588.
226. For an overview, see Laurent Pech, The Law of Holocaust Denial in
Europe: Toward a (Qualified) EU-wide Criminal Prohibition, in GENOCIDE
DENIALS AND THE LAW 185, 186–87 (Ludovic Hennebel & Thomas Hochmann
eds., 2011).
227. For example, Pech, after studying the law, concluded that “public authorities should . . . resist the enticing temptation to use the force of criminal
law to ‘sanctify’ clearly established historical facts.” Id. at 234.
228. See ROGER HOOD & CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH PENALTY: A
WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE 187–94 (2008).
229. See Geert Wilders, The First Amendment Is What We Need in Europe,
GATESTONE INST. (May 1, 2012), http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3042/geertwilders-first-amendment. Geert Wilders, an anti-immigrant Dutch politician,
was tried and acquitted of hate speech charges. For more, see Robert A.
Kahn, The Acquittal of Geert Wilders and Dutch Political Culture 1–3 (Univ.
of St. Thomas Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-31, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1956192. In future work I
plan to take up the actual influence of First Amendment doctrine at the Wilders trial.
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America out of the picture.230 But little insight is gained by pretending that the conversation as a whole is converging on a
shared set of goals if this is not the case.231 While all comparative study involves making simplifying choices, Teitel’s emphasis on “solidarity” and “cooperation” leaves too much out of an
unwieldy, raucous conversation—at least in the area of hate
speech regulation. Despite her stated desire to move away from
the static neo-functional method, her dialogic approach
amounts to neo-functionalism in new clothing.
CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF CONVERGENCE
Born in Denmark, enamored of the Soviet Union—until he
tried to live there—and then the subject of global outrage after
he published twelve cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed,
Flemming Rose was shaped by his experiences. The same applies for the theory of freedom of speech he developed in The
Tyranny of Silence. He compared himself to Soviet dissidents,
not Holmes and Brandeis; he borrowed Salman Rushdie’s view
of “man” as a story-telling animal against whom any speech
restriction was an “existential insult,” implicitly rejecting Justice Holmes’s view of the speaker as a “puny anonymity.” And
when he sought to explain the benefit of toleration for society
as a whole, he fell back on the Danish tradition of satire, not
Lee Bollinger’s genuinely “American” argument that toleration
is good for the social fabric of the country.
This leads to two larger conclusions. First, global theories of
comparative constitutional interpretation—while extremely
helpful to conceptualize issues—can only go so far in explaining
why people living in a given society support or oppose hate
speech bans. Personal experience and local culture also play a
role. So, in this regard, the functionalists are wrong to disre230. See, e.g., Tanya Kateri Hernadez, Hate Speech and the Language of
Racism in Latin America: A Lens for Reconsidering Global Hate Speech Restrictions and Legislation Models, 32 UNIV. PENN. J. INT’L. LAW 805, 805–06
(2011) (describing how discussions of hate speech regulation often ignore Latin America).
231. To her credit, Teitel recognizes that in some doctrinal areas, such as
criminal procedure, “the normative desirability of . . . convergence is debatable” because of “stark differences in legal cultures and political traditions.”
Teitel, supra note 21, at 2594. On the other hand, do these “stark differences”
necessarily play any less salient of a role in the protection of other human
rights?
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gard nationality (and more generally place) in accounting for
which legal doctrines triumph in a given legal system. To put it
another way, lawyers are people too—they will select ideas not
simply because they are useful, but because they like them.
What they like will be influenced by culture.
The turn to national identity theory would return comparative law to its late nineteenth-century origin, a time of radical
nationalism.232 This early comparative theory was faulted as
“static,” “descriptive,” and “Eurocentric.”233 But there is a difference. The late nineteenth-century comparative lawyers saw
“national laws as autonomous, static, incontrovertible entities”—a reflection of nation-states seen in the same way.234 By
contrast, the modern identity theory is much more fluid. Anderson, instead of taking nations as given, views them as created by discursive practices.235 Likewise, Barth rejected the
static, formalistic concept of identity, with a recognition that
identity depends on boundaries and can change as the boundaries change.236 What is more, even from a neo-functionalist perspective, taking considerations of national identity into account
will enrich doctrinal analysis by suggesting reasons why a given doctrinal perspective will be more “useful” (or at least more
convincing) in one society or culture than in another.237
Second, the global marketplace of ideas is a competitive one.
Dialogue is not simply about “global solidarity” that arrives at
a “universal ‘law of humanity.’”238 Rather than leading toward
a communitarian Galaxia that marks the end point of the Isaac
Asimov Foundation novels,239 the global discourse over hate
232. See Colloquium, Comparative Law: Problems and Prospects, 26 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 935, 942 (2011).
233. Id. at 942–43.
234. Id. at 942; see HUGH SETON-WATSON, NATIONALISM OLD AND NEW
(1965).
235. ANDERSON, supra note 209, at 6 (describing the nation state as an imagined community).
236. Barth, supra note 209, at 14–15.
237. For a discussion of the role of national identity theory in the international law context, see Robert J. Delahunty, Nationalism, Statism and Cosmopolitanism, 5 NW. INTERDISC. L. REV. 77, 129–36 (2012).
238. Teitel, supra note 21, at 2586–87, 2593.
239. Isaac Asimov’s Foundation series explores a future in which humans
settle the Milky Way Galaxy. The “foundation” is a plan to restore order to
the galaxy after the collapse of the First Galactic Empire. Galaxia is an alternative plan in which individual humans become part of a single living or-
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speech regulation is better seen as an endless discussion. During this discussion, some ideas will be dominant for a time;
then they will be challenged and replaced by other ideas. And
make no mistake, the American free speech canon has been
very popular over the past half century. But Flemming Rose’s
ability to construct an extended defense of his decision to run
the Danish cartoons without more than scarcely mentioning it
raises doubts about the supposedly hegemonic position of the
American canon in the global free speech debate. It also raises
deeper doubts about whether free speech discourse will ever
“culminate” in a hegemonic, universal singularity—a doctrinal
black hole so powerful that divergent views no longer escape.240

ganism that encompasses all humans living in the galaxy. ISAAC ASIMOV,
FOUNDATION’S EDGE 358–66 (Doubleday & Co. ed. 1982).
240. Even Asimov was uncomfortable with an end to all conflict. After having set the human convergence as the future of the Milky Way, Asimov, in
the last ten pages of his final book, raises the possibility of an attack by a
non-human species from beyond the galaxy. His point is mine—conflict,
change, and uncertainty are an unavoidable part of human existence. ISAAC
ASIMOV, FOUNDATION AND EARTH 344–56 (Doubleday & Co. ed. 1986).

